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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Appellant/Petitioner : 
v. : 
MICHAEL VON FERGUSON : Case No. 20050376-SC 
Appellee/Respondent : Respondent is incarcerated. 
REPLY BRIEF OF CROSS-PETITIONER 
INTRODUCTION 
This reply brief on cross-petition is limited to the issue raised on cross-petition in 
Point II of the brief of Respondent/Cross-Petitioner Michael Von Ferguson 
("Respondent's brief). See page 25-49 of Respondent's brief. In Point II, Respondent 
argued that since the judgment shows on its face that he was not represented by counsel, 
the state had the burden of establishing a constitutionally adequate waiver of counsel in 
order to use the prior conviction to enhance the current charge to a felony. See 
Respondent's brief at 25-49. This cross-reply further demonstrates that the trial court 
correctly placed the burden on the state, and the court of appeals erred in presuming that 
Ferguson waived counsel and overturning the decision of the trial court. See trial court 
ruling in Addendum A. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Claims that a defendant was denied his right to counsel have a "special status" in 
post-conviction proceedings. This Court has recently recognized that this "special status" 
precludes a court from presuming that a defendant waived counsel unless there is 
evidence that the defendant affirmatively acquiesced in proceeding without counsel. This 
is consistent with United States Supreme Court case law which precludes presuming 
waiver of counsel from a silent record. Regardless of how this Court characterizes the 
role of the presumption of regularity when the judgment shows that the defendant did not 
have counsel - that it attaches but does not include a presumption that the defendant 
waived counsel, that it attaches but is rebutted by the judgment showing that defendant 
did not have counsel, or that it does not attach at all - this Court's case law and that of the 
United States Supreme Court establish that a court cannot presume that the defendant 
waived counsel. 
The state's claim that the analysis for waiver of counsel claims set forth in Heaton 
and Faretta does not apply in collateral proceedings is without merit. The state does not 
cite to any cases that support this claim. Instead, the state relies on a single case where 
the Court refused to apply the presumption employed on direct appeal for Boykin claims 
in a collateral proceeding. But Boykin claims do not have the "special status" that 
deprivation of counsel claims have, and the United States Supreme Court has made it 
clear that right to counsel claims can be addressed in collateral proceedings. 
Additionally, Heaton and a variety of other cases rely on collateral decisions which apply 
2 
the same analysis to lack of waiver of counsel claims as that which is applied on direct 
appeal. 
Finally, the state's claim that if it loses on certiorari, it nevertheless should be 
given another chance to sustain its burden of proof should be rejected. Aside from the 
state's failure to adequately brief this claim, the claim disregards the fact that the 
enhancement has been dismissed in the trial court. The state has not cited any statutes, 
rules or case law that would allow it to resurrect a dismissed enhancement, and it fails to 
cite or consider case law that precludes refiling unless there is newly discovered evidence 
or good cause. If this Court ultimately affirms the trial court ruling, there will be nothing 
in the trial court to review. Additionally, if the state thought it could just try again in the 
trial court to sustain its burden, it should have done so rather than taking this appeal and 
subsequent certiorari review while Ferguson was being held pretrial in the county jail. 
Allowing the state a "second bite of the apple" under these circumstances would 
encourage poor preparation by prosecutors, be costly and time consuming to defendants 
and courts, and lead to further delay in this case. 
ARGUMENT 
Reply on Cross-Petition 
POINT. BECAUSE THE JUDGMENT SHOWED THAT FERGUSON WAS 
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, THE STATE WAS REQUIRED TO 
ESTABLISH A CONSTITUTIONALLY ADEQUATE WAIVER OF COUNSEL 
This Court's recent decision in Lucero v. Kennard, 2005 UT 79, 539 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 21 (see Addendum B) and other cases establish that the trial court correctly refused 
to presume that Ferguson waived counsel. Regardless of whether the presumption did 
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not attach, attached but did not include a presumption that Ferguson's right to counsel 
was preserved, or attached and was rebutted because Ferguson was not represented by 
counsel, the burden was on the state to establish a constitutionally adequate waiver of 
counsel since the judgment showed that Ferguson was not represented. In addition, the 
state's claim in its reply brief that the analysis for assessing waiver of counsel claims 
outlined in State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911 (Utah 1998) and Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 
806 (1975) does not apply to post-conviction proceedings is without merit and should be 
rejected. Moreover, the state's request that it should be given another chance to establish 
that Ferguson waived counsel so as to reinstate the dismissed enhancement should be 
denied since the state has had the opportunity to sustain its burden and the matter has 
been dismissed below. 
A. Waiver of Counsel Cannot Be Presumed 
As the state acknowledges, this Court recently reiterated that a defendant's claim 
that he was denied his right to counsel has a "special status" in post-conviction 
proceedings. State's reply brief at 19-21, citing Lucero, 2005 UT 79,1J25 (see Addendum 
B). Because of this "special status," even when the judgment enjoys a presumption of 
regularity, waiver of counsel cannot be presumed. Id. This Court's recent discussion is 
consistent with United States Supreme Court case law, this Court's cases, and cases from 
other jurisdictions, all of which demonstrate that the government is required to establish 
waiver of counsel when a judgment shows that the defendant was not represented. 
Regardless of whether a presumption of regularity attaches and is rebutted or does not 
attach at all, Lucero and other cases require that courts can not presume waiver under 
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these circumstances. Id. In this case, where the only evidence placed before the trial 
court at the motion to quash hearing showed that Ferguson was not represented by 
counsel, the court of appeals erred in presuming that Ferguson made a constitutionally 
adequate waiver of counsel. See State v. Ferguson, 2005 UT App 144, 1}31, 111 P.3d 
820. 
This Court recognized in Lucero that because of the "special status" of deprivation 
of counsel claims, a court cannot presume waiver even when a presumption of regularity 
attaches to a judgment. Lucero, 2005 UT 79,111124, 25. Although this Court 
acknowledged that "where a defendant seeks to collaterally attack a court's judgment, we 
presume the regularity of the proceedings below," it also recognized that such a 
presumption does not include a presumption that the defendant waived counsel. Id. This 
Court stated: 
That presumption [of regularity] notwithstanding, the analysis of whether a 
defendant is entitled to post-conviction relief is more complicated in cases where a 
defendant raises a deprivation of counsel claim because of the "special status" 
conferred upon the constitutional right to counsel. Lackawanna County Dist. 
Attorney v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394, 404, 121 S.Ct. 1567, 149 L.Ed.2d 608 (2001) 
(concluding that failure to appoint counsel claim "warrants special treatment 
among alleged constitutional violations"); see Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 
485, 494-96, 114 S.Ct. 1732. 128 L.Ed.2d 517 (1994) (discussing the "historical 
basis" for treating collateral attacks based on a denial of the right to counsel 
differently than other constitutional rights). A court may not presume waiver of 
the right to counsel unless there is some evidence that the defendant affirmatively 
acquiesced to the waiver of counsel. See Carnley v. Cochran. 369 U.S. 506, 516-
17, 82 S.Ct. 884, 8 L.Ed.2d 70 (1962) ("[N]o . . . burden [to overcome 
presumption of regularity] can be imposed upon an accused unless the record - - or 
a hearing, where required - - reveals his affirmative acquiescence."); State v. 
Hamilton, 1987 Utah LEXIS 638 at T[5 (Waiver [of the right to counsel] may not 
be presumed from a silent record.") see also Arbuckle v. Turner, 440 F.2d 586, 
589 (10th Cir. 1971); Clark v. Turner, 283 F. Supp. 909, 913 (D. Utah 1968) 
(same). If such evidence is presented, the defendant has the burden of proving that 
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the right to counsel was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived. See 
Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 92. 124 S.Ct. 1379, 158 L.Ed.2d 209 (2004) ("[I]n a 
collateral attack on an uncounseled conviction, it is the defendant's burden to 
prove that he did not competently and intelligently waive his right to the assistance 
of counsel."); Carnley, 369 U.S. at 515, 82 S.Ct. 884 ("Presuming waiver [of the 
right to counsel] from a silent record is impermissible. The record must show, or 
there must be an allegation and evidence which show, that an accused was offered 
counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer."); see also Dyett 
v. Turner, 287 F.Supp. 113, 115-16 (D.Utah 1968) (imposing burden on defendant 
to show invalidity of waiver of counsel when the record did not indicate that the 
waiver was involuntary); McGhee v. Sigler, 328 F.Supp. 538, 542 (D.Neb.1971) 
("[I]f there was acquiescence by the defendant in the trial court's not appointing 
counsel, the burden then becomes the defendant's...."). 
Lucero, 2005 UT 79, ^[25. Contrary to the state's suggestion that this discussion should 
be overturned or disregarded because it is not well reasoned and is dictum (state's reply 
brief at 19-22), this Court should follow Lucero since the analysis challenged by the state 
is based on well established case law and was integral to the Lucero decision. See id. 
As this Court pointed out in Lucero, Lackawanna and Custis recognize the 
"special status" afforded right to counsel claims. Id. (citing Lackawanna, 532 U.S. at 
404; Custis, 11 U.S. at 496). Both of these cases indicate that the '"failure to appoint 
counsel for an indigent [is] a unique constitutional defect. . . ris[ing] to the level of a 
jurisdictional defect,' which therefore warrants special treatment among alleged 
constitutional violations." Lackawanna, 532 U.S. at 404 (quoting Custis, 511 U.S. at 
496). In fact, the Court emphasized in Lackawanna that the special status of Gideon1 
claims is well established, and because of that special status, created an exception 
allowing defendants to challenge a prior conviction used to increase a federal sentence 
even though the prior conviction was "conclusively valid" because the defendant had no 
1
 Gideon v. Wainwright 372 U.S. 335 (1963) 
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further collateral attack available. Lackawanna, 532 U.S. at 403-04. 
Additionally, as the state recognizes, Carnley, 369 U.S. at 516-17, precludes a 
court from "presuming] that a defendant waived counsel where the trial record is silent 
on the matter." State's reply brief at 22. This Court recognized that rule in Lucero, 
stating that "[a] court may not presume waiver of the right to counsel unless there is some 
evidence that the defendant affirmatively acquiesced to the waiver of counsel." Lucero, 
2005 UT 79, |^25 (citing Carnley, 369 U.S. at 516-17). In addition, this Court quoted 
Carnley for the proposition that a defendant does not have the burden to establish lack of 
waiver '"unless the record - - or a hearing, where required - - reveals his affirmative 
acquiescence [in proceeding without counsel].'" Lucero, 2005 UT 79, f25 (quoting 
Carnley, 369 U.S. at 516-17). 
The state attempts to undermine the rule of Carnley by unduly narrowing its 
holding to circumstances where the trial court has reviewed the entire record of the prior 
proceeding, including a transcript, and finds nothing to support a waiver of counsel. See 
state's reply brief at 21-22. But Carnley explicitly precludes a court from presuming 
waiver of counsel, regardless of what the parties put before it for review, unless the 
evidence before the court indicates that the defendant acquiesced in proceeding without 
counsel. See Carnley, 369 U.S. at 516-17. Moreover, the Carnley Court's statement that 
either a record "or hearing where required" can establish whether a defendant waived 
counsel (Id.) demonstrates that the Court did not limit its refusal to presume waiver to 
only those circumstances where a court had a transcript before it and instead adopted a 
rule that precluded presuming waiver when there was nothing before the court to suggest 
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that the defendant had waived counsel. Id. (emphasis added). Accordingly, Carnley 
demonstrates that unless the state introduces evidence that a defendant who appeared pro 
se waived counsel, the defendant cannot be required to overcome a presumption that his 
right to counsel was preserved. 
In addition to being solidly based on case law, Lucero's discussion of the burden 
of proof was integral to the decision in that case. Lucero claimed that his right to counsel 
had been violated in a justice court proceeding and filed a petition for post-conviction 
review in district court. On certiorari, the justice court argued that the court of appeals' 
decision that Lucero was not entitled to post-conviction relief because he had not 
appealed should be upheld in part because "justice court defendants are not eligible to 
receive post-conviction relief under the PCRA [Post-Conviction Remedies Act]." 
Lucero, 2005 UT 79, T[9. According to the justice court, the lack of a record injustice 
courts precluded post-conviction review of Lucero's claim that he was deprived of 
counsel and supported the court of appeals' decision that a trial de novo appeal was 
Lucero's only remedy. Id. Because of the important role played by presumptions and 
burdens of proof, particularly when there is no record available, this Court necessarily 
was required to discuss the manner in which Lucero's Gideon claim could be reviewed 
since there was no record. Hence, this Court's discussion in Lucero indicating that a 
court cannot presume waiver of counsel unless the record affirmatively demonstrates that 
a defendant acquiesced in proceeding without counsel was necessary to the decision in 
Lucero. See id. 
Regardless of how this Court characterizes the role of the presumption of 
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regularity when the judgment shows the defendant was not represented by counsel, 
Lucero and the cases cited therein demonstrate that the presumption does not require a 
defendant to establish that he did not waive counsel unless the record affirmatively shows 
that he agreed to proceed without counsel. See Lucero, 2005 UT 79, [^25; Dyett v. 
Turner, 287 F. Supp. 113, 115-16 (D. Utah 1968) (cited favorably in Lucero, 2005 UT 
79, H25). In other words, regardless of whether the presumption does not attach, attaches 
but does not include a presumption that the defendant waived counsel, or attaches but is 
rebutted because the judgment shows that Ferguson did not have counsel, Lucero and the 
cases cited therein support Ferguson's position that he cannot be required to establish that 
he did not waive counsel. Lucero, 2005 UT 79, ^|25. In fact, Lucero, the cases cited 
therein, Triptow, and other cases demonstrate that if the record shows that a defendant 
waived counsel, the burden shifts to the defendant to establish that the waiver was not 
knowing and voluntary, but if the record simply shows that the defendant was not 
represented without showing that he waived counsel, the burden remains with the state to 
establish waiver. See Lucero, 2005 UT 79, ^|25; see also Dyett, 287 F.Supp. at 115-16. 
Contrary to the state's assertions, Triptow does not override Lucero. See state's 
reply brief at 24-5. Triptow involved circumstances where the judgment was silent as to 
whether Triptow was represented by counsel, and this Court presumed that the trial court 
had proceeded with regularity, which included a presumption that Triptow was 
represented by counsel. State v. Triptow, 770 P.2d 146, 149 (Utah 1989). In order to 
rebut this presumption, Triptow was required to "raise the issue and produce some 
evidence that he [ ] was not represented by counsel and did not knowingly waive 
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counsel." Id. By contrast, this case and Lucero involve circumstances where the 
defendant was not represented by counsel; because the record in Triptow did not show 
that defendant was unrepresented, Triptow did not directly address the circumstances of 
this case. Instead, well established case law which precludes presuming waiver of 
counsel from a silent record controls and places the burden to establish waiver on the 
state. See Lucero, 2005 UT 79.125. 
Additionally, Triptow involved a felony conviction where this Court attached a 
presumption of regularity, including a presumption that Triptow was represented by 
counsel, to a judgment that did not show that Triptow was unrepresented. By contrast, 
the conviction at issue in this case was a misdemeanor conviction taken during a busy 
misdemeanor calendar where the details attendant to felony convictions are not always 
observed. See generally Dressier v. State. 819P.2d 1288, 1295 (Nev. 1991) (recognizing 
that because of "the informal nature of the prosecution of misdemeanor cases, [ ] the 
stringent standard of review used in felony cases" does not apply). As set forth in 
Respondent's opening brief at 35-36 and 44, some courts have recognized that 
misdemeanors are not always given the same exacting protections that occur in felony 
prosecutions and have therefore refused to apply a presumption of constitutional validity 
or a presumption that the right to counsel was protected to a misdemeanor conviction 
obtained under these circumstances. See e^g. Dressier. 819 P.2d at 1295. This Court 
likewise should acknowledge the reality of busy misdemeanor calendars is that 
constitutional protections are not always as carefully observed as they are in felony 
prosecutions and refuse to presume that the right to counsel was observed in this case, 
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especially in the face of a record showing that both the trial court and trial judge in this 
case were unaware that Ferguson had a right to counsel in a suspended jail case. See 
Respondent's brief at 35. 
Despite the distinctions between this case and Triptow and this Court's more 
recent analysis in Lucero, the state argues that Triptow controls and requires that a 
defendant such as Ferguson must produce some evidence not only that he was 
unrepresented but also that he did not waive counsel. State's reply brief at 32. In 
addition to the fact that Triptow involved a felony prosecution and did not directly 
address this issue since the judgment did not show that Triptow was unrepresented, the 
rationale in Triptow and its selection of a middle ground position for assessing burdens of 
proof further demonstrates that a defendant is not required to establish evidence of waiver 
of counsel under these circumstances. 
In fact, this Court rejected a position taken by some courts that requires defendants 
to prove lack of representation and lack of a constitutionally adequate waiver and instead 
embraced what it perceived to be as a fairer, middle ground position. Triptow, 770 P.2d 
at 148-49. That position takes into account the presumption of regularity, but also allows 
that presumption to be rebutted by a relatively minor showing by the defendant that his 
right to counsel may have been violated. Under the current state of the law, given the 
court of appeals' opinion in State v. Gutierrez, 2003 UT App 95, 68 P.3d 1035, which 
precludes a defendant from presenting "some evidence" that he did not waive counsel 
through affidavits, pursuant to the state's argument, any defendant claiming that his right 
to counsel was violated would be required to produce transcripts and court records, 
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regardless of whether the judgment showed that the defendant appeared without counsel.2 
Id. at TJ7. This would essentially place the burden on the defendant to establish "that there 
was an actual lack of representation without a knowing waiver of counsel in the earlier 
proceeding" in all cases. Triptow, 770 P.2d at 148. Since Triptow rejected this position, 
the state's argument that the defendant is required to establish lack of waiver even though 
the judgment shows he was not represented, fails under Triptow. 
Moreover, the effect of the state's argument in this case, if successful, would be 
that if a defendant did not produce court records or transcripts either because he could not 
afford them or was not represented and did not know how to obtain them, the prior 
conviction would be automatically admissible even though it showed that the defendant 
was not represented. In other words, the state's analysis creates a presumption that the 
defendant waived counsel which is contrary to Lucero and the controlling case law. 
As Triptow acknowledges, some courts have taken a more stringent position and 
required a defendant to establish that he did not waive counsel. See Triptow, 770 P.2d at 
148-49. To the extent the state cites cases that apply this more stringent position, those 
cases have no application in the face of Triptow's decision to apply a middle position and 
2
 Although the state claims that "placing the burden on defendant [to establish that he did 
not waive counsel] makes sense because he is likely to know whether he was represented 
and, if not, whether he waived counsel" (state's reply brief at 17), a defendant's assertion 
that he did not have counsel and did not waive counsel is not sufficient to rebut the 
presumption of regularity under Gutierrez, 2003 UT App 95, which is controlling in 
Utah's trial courts. Since the state is seeking to use the conviction to prove an element of 
a crime and has more resources and the ability to obtain a complete record, it actually 
makes more sense to require the state to establish waiver. Additionally, since waiver of 
counsel is a legal concept, the state's assertion that a defendant is in the best position to 
know whether he waived counsel is incorrect. 
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this Court's recent discussion in Lucero. Additionally, cases that presumed waiver when 
the record shows the defendant was not represented are inconsistent with United States 
Supreme Court case law. See e.g. Carnley, 369 U.S. at 516-17. 
Moreover, many of the cases cited by the state for the proposition that Ferguson 
had the burden of proving waiver involve different circumstances than the present case. 
For example, it is not clear whether the judgment in United States v. Quintana-Ponce, 
129 Fed. Appx. 473, 475 (10th Cir. 2005) showed that the defendant appeared without 
counsel, and in United States v. Cruz-Alcala, 338 F.3d 1475 (10th Cir. 2003), the record 
was not silent regarding waiver and instead showed that defendant waived counsel. Id. at 
1198. Other cases cited by the state such as State v. Probst, 339 Or. 612, 124 P.3d 1237 
(Or. 2005) involved circumstances where the record showed that the defendant 
acquiesced in proceeding without counsel after being informed of the right and the risks 
of proceeding without counsel. As this Court recognized in Lucero, circumstances where 
the record shows that the defendant acquiesced in proceeding without counsel are 
different from the circumstances of this case where the record shows only that Ferguson 
did not have counsel; when the record shows that the defendant agreed to proceed 
without counsel, a court can place the burden of establishing that a waiver was not 
knowingly and voluntarily made on the defendant. Lucero, 2005 UT 79, [^25. 
In this case where the judgment showed that Ferguson was not represented, the 
trial court had before it "some evidence" demonstrating that his right to counsel was 
violated. Pursuant to case law from this Court and the United States Supreme Court, the 
trial court correctly concluded that it could not presume waiver of counsel, and the state's 
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failure to establish waiver of counsel required that the enhancement be stricken. 
B. Heaton and Faretta Apply to Collateral Attacks 
The state also argues, without any support, that case law governing waiver of 
counsel in criminal cases applies only on direct review and not in the post-conviction 
context. State's reply brief at 33. This Court should reject that claim because it is not 
supported by case law, fails to take into account the "special status" of Gideon claims, 
fails to ensure that the right to counsel is carefully protected, fails to suggest what 
analysis, if any should be employed in collateral proceedings where the defendant's right 
to counsel was violated in the trial court, and fails to acknowledge case law employing 
exacting standards for determining waiver on collateral review. 
Although the state claims that a defendant who is denied his right to counsel and 
subsequently fails to appeal is precluded from arguing that he did not make a 
constitutionally adequate waiver of counsel as required by State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911 
(Utah 1998) and Faretta v. California, 402 U.S. 806 (1975) (state's reply brief at 33), the 
state fails to back this claim with any case law suggesting that a right to counsel claim 
cannot be raised in post-conviction review. See generally Utah R. App. P. 24(a) 
(outlining requirements for adequate briefing); State v. Lee, 2006 UT 5, TJ22, P.3d 
(further citation omitted) ("to be adequate, briefs must provide 'meaningful legal 
analysis'"). Instead, the state relies solely on Parke v. Ralev. 506 U.S. 20 (1992), a 
United States Supreme Court case that deals with the application of Boykin v. Alabama, 
395 U.S. 238 (1969) in a habeas proceeding. While the state is correct that the Court 
concluded that Boykin's presumption of invalidity does not apply in the habeas context, 
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Parke does not support the state's claim that the analysis for waiver of counsel claims 
outlined in Heaton, Faretta, and other cases does not apply on collateral review. See 
Parke, 506 U.S. at 29. 
United States Supreme Court case law, including Parke, has made it clear that 
right to counsel claims are "subject to collateral attack in federal habeas court." Id. at 29 
(citing inter alia Johnson v. Zerbst 304 U.S. 458 (1938)). The Court has also made it 
clear that deprivation of counsel claims have a "special status" and are given greater 
protection than Boykin claims. Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 493-97 (1994). 
The Court in Custis distinguished Boykin claims from right to counsel claims, 
emphasizing that habeas review of right to counsel claims has a "historical basis in our 
jurisprudence" that "treat[s] the right to have counsel appointed as unique, perhaps 
because of our oftstated view that 'the right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little 
avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.'" Custis, 511 U.S. at 494 
(further citation omitted). The Custis Court declined "to extend the right to attack 
collaterally prior convictions used for sentence enhancement beyond the right to have 
appointed counsel established in Gideon" by distinguishing the role of Boykin in a plea 
hearing from the special role the right to counsel plays in a criminal proceeding. Id. at 
496. Custis, which the state fails to acknowledge in making its argument that waiver of 
counsel cases do not apply in habeas, establishes that Boykin claims such as the claim in 
Parke do not enjoy the same protection as Gideon claims and also acknowledges that 
deprivation of counsel claims can be reviewed collaterally. Id.; see also Lackawanna, 
532 U.S. at 403 (when a defendant claims that his right to counsel was violated in a prior 
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proceeding, an exception exists to general rule that defendant cannot attack a 
"conclusively valid" prior conviction). 
Additional case law demonstrates that cases analyzing the requirements for a 
constitutionally valid waiver apply with equal force in the habeas context as they do on 
direct review. Such application is critical to ensure that the right to counsel is observed 
and concomitantly, to ensure the fairness of the trial court proceedings. See Custis, 511 
U.S. at 494. For example, Carnley was a habeas case where the United States Supreme 
Court considered whether the defendant had knowingly and voluntarily waived counsel 
and refused to employ presumptions in favor of waiver, pointing out that "to cast such a 
burden on the accused is wholly at war with the standard of proof of waiver of the right to 
counsel which we have laid down in Johnson v. Zerbst, [ ] ." Carnley, 369 U.S. at 514 
(citing Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464-65). The high Court approached the waiver of counsel 
issue in a manner similar to this Court's approach in Heaton, placing the responsibility on 
the trial court to clearly establish that the defendant knowingly and willingly proceeded 
without counsel and indicating that the preferred method would be for such a 
determination "to appear upon the record." Id. at 515 (further citation omitted). The 
Court stated in Carnley: 
It has been pointed out that 'courts indulge every reasonable presumption against 
waiver' of fundamental constitutional rights and that we 'do not presume 
acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.' 
'The constitutional right of an accused to be represented by counsel invokes, of 
itself, the protection of a trial court, in which the accused - - whose life and liberty 
is at stake - - is without counsel. This protecting duty imposes the serious and 
weighty responsibility upon the trial judge of determining whether there is na 
intelligent and competent waiver by an accused. While an accused may waive the 
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right to counsel, whether there is a proper waiver should be clearly determined by 
the trial court, and it would be fitting and appropriate for that determination to 
appear on the record. 
Id. at 514 (quoting Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464-65). 
Without distinguishing between cases on direct review and those on collateral 
view, the Court in Faretta also emphasized that a constitutionally adequate waiver 
requires that a defendant "competently and intelligently [] choose self-representation" 
and that to make such a choice, the defendant "should be made aware of the dangers and 
disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that 'he knows what 
he is doing and his choice is made with his eyes open.'" Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 
(quoting Adams v. United States ex rel, McCann, 317 US 269, 279 (1942)). In fact, 
Adams, the case relied on by the Faretta court for this proposition, was a habeas case. 
See id. 
Heaton itself indicates that there is no distinction between the analysis applied for 
deprivation of counsel challenges raised on direct appeal and those raised in a habeas 
proceeding. See Heaton, 958 P.2d at 917-19. In outlining the requirements for 
establishing waiver, this Court relied on habeas cases as well as direct review cases. Id. 
Quoting Johnson, a habeas case, this Court emphasized a trial court's "weighty 
responsibility" in ensuring that any waiver of counsel is made intelligently and 
competently. Id. at 917 (citing Johnson, 304 U.S. at 465). Additionally, still relying on 
Johnson, this Court recognized that in light of the "heavy burden placed on the trial court 
to protect this right, there is a presumption against waiver, and doubts concerning waiver 
must be resolved in the defendant's favor." Heaton, 958 P.2d at 917. 
17 
In concluding that "the court must advise the defendant of the dangers and 
disadvantages of self-representation 'so that the record will establish that "he knows what 
he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open,'"" Heaton cited Faretta and Adams, 
the underlying habeas case which gave rise to this language, as well as the habeas case of 
Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 723-24 (1948). Id. at 918. Moreover, this Court 
quoted the habeas case of Von Moltke for the proposition that '"[a] judge can make 
certain that an accused's professed waiver of counsel is understandingly and wisely made 
only from penetrating and comprehensive examination of all the circumstances."' 
Heaton, 958 P.2d at 918 (quoting Von Moltke, 332 U.S. at 724). This Court's reliance on 
both habeas and direct review cases in reaching its decision in Heaton further 
demonstrates that the state's claim that the Heaton analysis does not apply in collateral 
proceedings is without merit. See also Von Moltke, 332 U.S. at 724 (recognizing that a 
constitutionally adequate waiver of counsel requires more than "the asking of several 
standard questions followed by the signing of a standard waiver of counsel"); Lucero v. 
Kennard, 2004 UT App 94, ^22-30, 89 P.3d 175 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (applying 
Heaton and other waiver cases in post-conviction context). 
Aside from the inadequacy of the state's briefing on this point, the state's claim 
that Heaton and related cases do not apply in a habeas proceeding should be rejected 
because it is contrary to case law and would undermine the important role of the right to 
counsel in criminal cases. 
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C. The State's Failure to Sustain Its Burden of Establishing Waiver Precludes 
Further Attempts by the State to Reinstate the Dismissed Enhancement on 
Remand 
As a final matter, the state asks that this Court give it a second chance to sustain its 
burden should this Court agree with the trial court that it was required to establish that 
Ferguson waived counsel. State's reply brief at 34-36. According to the state, since this 
is an interlocutory appeal, when this case is remanded it can again try to sustain its 
burden of showing that Ferguson waived counsel in the prior proceeding. State's reply 
brief at 34-36 
The obvious problem with the state's argument is that the trial court dismissed the 
enhancement; in the event this Court affirms the trial court, there is no enhancement in 
place and nothing for the state to attempt to establish. The state has had the opportunity 
to present the evidence to the trial court and to appeal the trial court ruling while 
Ferguson has been incarcerated pretrial in the Salt Lake County Jail. The state had the 
resources to obtain a transcript and its failure to do so in an effort to sustain its burden so 
as to elevate this case to a felony should preclude a further opportunity to do so. 
As the state concedes, either party could have introduced a transcript, but the state 
was the moving party that was trying to add an element that would turn this crime into a 
felony; by not making that effort in order to sustain its burden of proof, the state has 
given up its ability to prosecute this charge as an enhanced felony. The state's failure to 
obtain a transcript under these circumstances precludes a determination that Ferguson 
waived counsel and "[a]t most, suggests apprehension on [the state's part] as to what a 
transcript of the plea proceeding may disclose." State's reply brief at 36. 
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As a threshold matter, the state has failed to include any authority supporting its 
request that it be given another "bite of the apple" when this case returns to the trial court, 
Because the state provides no support for its claim that even though the enhancement has 
been dismissed, it can try again when the case is remanded, this Court should refuse to 
review the claim. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a); Lee, 2006 UT 5, ^22 (requiring adequate 
briefing in order to review an issue). 
Moreover, fairness, due process, and the orderly administration of justice demand 
that the state not be given "a second bite of the apple." State v. Aspen, 412 N.W. 2d 881, 
884 (S.D. 1987). Ferguson has not yet gone to trial and has been in the Salt Lake County 
Jail for thirty four months as of the date on which this reply brief is filed.3 If the state is 
given the opportunity to further litigate this issue in the trial court, additional delay will 
occur in that court and, in all likelihood, the state might again request interlocutory 
review if it is unsuccessful. Indeed, the state's reply brief suggests that if it has the 
opportunity to revisit this issue, legal arguments regarding what constitutes a 
constitutionally adequate waiver will be raised. See state's reply brief at 33-34. Since 
the state had the opportunity and responsibility to establish a waiver of counsel, the state 
should not be afforded a second opportunity to "ameliorate] its weak and deficient 
3
 The state appealed the trial court's order and is also the petitioner on certiorari review. 
This case has been on interlocutory review for more than two years as of the date of this 
brief; the Court of Appeals granted the state's petition for interlocutory review on 
January 30, 2004 (R. 323) and the trial court stayed proceedings on February 2, 2004. R. 
325. If the state thought it could sustain its burden by providing a transcript of the prior 
proceeding, it should have done so rather than requiring Ferguson to sit in the county jail 
for this extended period of time while it pursued an appeal and certiorari review. The 
state's request that it should be given a second chance to sustain its burden should be 
denied under these circumstances. 
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original evidentiary proof . . . ." Aspen, 412 N.W. 2d at 884. Subjecting Ferguson to 
repeated hearings as the state attempts to assemble its case "is costly to the defendant and 
state and time consuming of judicial resources." Id. at 884, n.5. In addition, it 
encourages poor preparation by the state and fails to hold the state to its "responsibility to 
assemble its proof, in good, effective professionalism, and proceed thereupon." Id- n.5. 
Although Aspen was decided on double jeopardy grounds in a case where the 
enhancement was presented for sentencing purposes, the rationale applies with equal or 
greater force in this context where Ferguson has not yet gone to trial. See State v. 
Rogers, 2005 UT App 379,1(28, 122 P.3d 661 (due process requires "that an unprepared 
prosecutor should not be free to proceed against a defendant multiple times until her 
preparation finally reaches the minimal level required for bindover"); State v. Brickey, 
714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986) (fundamental fairness precludes prosecution from refiling 
dismissed charges unless new evidence or other good cause exists). Allowing the state 
repeated opportunities to sustain its burden of proof interferes with the orderly 
administration of justice, encourages lack of preparation on the part of prosecutors and 
subjects defendants to much lengthier pretrial delay. Accordingly, Ferguson requests that 
the state not be given a "second bite of the apple" should this Court uphold the trial 
court's ruling. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellee/Respondent/Cross-Petitioner Michael Ferguson, by and through counsel, 
respectfully requests that this Court affirm the decision of the trial court and court of 
appeals that a misdemeanor conviction with a suspended sentence obtained in violation of 
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the right to counsel cannot be used to enhance a subsequent charge to a felony. 
Respondent/Cross-Petitioner Ferguson also requests that this Court reverse the court of 
appeals' decision that he had the burden of proving that he did not waive counsel, and 
uphold the trial court's dismissal of the enhancement. 
SUBMITTED this ; K _ day of February, 2006. 
( '-cjQzZy 
JOAN C. WATT 
DEBRA M. NELSON 
VERNICE TREASE 
Attorneys for Respondent/Cross-Petitioner 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
MICHAEL VON FERGUSON, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND ORDER 
Case No. 031902097 
Judge ROBIN W. REESE 
The Defendant's Motion to Quash the Bindover having come before this Court for 
hearing in the above entitled matter on October 24th, 2003, and November 3rd, 2003, in 
which Defendant was represented by counsel, Vernice Trease, and the State was 
represented by counsel, B. Kent Morgan and Alicia H. Cook, the Court having fully 
considered the written memoranda and oral arguments of counsel, this Court now enters 
its FINDINGS OF FACT and CONCLUSIONS OF LAW and ORDER. 
j th 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On March 18;n, 2003, the defendant pled guilty to violating a protective order, a 
class A misdemeanor, before Judge Medley in District Court case number 
031901111, and was sentenced to 365 days in jail. The defendant was not 
represented by counsel when he entered his plea. The jail sentence was 
suspended in its entirety and the defendant was placed on probation. 
2. On March 26th, 2003, the State filed an information alleging that the defendant 
had committed Attempted Homicide, Violation of a Protective Order, Burglary, 
and Theft of a Firearm. The protective order violation was enhanced to a third 
degree felony based on the defendant's prior conviction in case number 
031901111. 
3. A preliminary hearing was held on August 26th, 2003, before Judge Iwasaki. The 
State presented evidence that the defendant, while carrying a loaded rifle, had 
climbed onto the roof of a building neighboring the victim's workplace. The 
State also offered a certified copy of the prior conviction to support the enhanced 
protective order violation. Defense counsel objected to the use of the prior 
conviction, and argued that an uncounseled plea could not be used to enhance a 
subsequent offense. The Court overruled the objection and at the conclusion of 
the hearing found sufficient probable cause to bind over the Attempted Homicide 
and Protective Order Violation charges. 
4. On October 16th, 2003, counsel for the defense filed a Motion to Quash the 
Bindover. The defense argued that the defendant's prior uncounseled 
misdemeanor conviction could not be used to enhance the subsequent offense, and 
urged the Court to strike the enhancement. The defense also argued that the 
evidence presented at the preliminary hearing failed to establish that the defendant 
had actually violated the protective order. 
5. This Court heard oral arguments on October 24 ,2003. At the conclusion of the 
arguments, the Court requested that counsel brief the application of Alabama v. 
Shelton to the instant case, and scheduled further arguments for November 3rd, 
2003. 
6. During the November 3rd hearing, counsel for the State argued that Shelton 
prohibits the imposition of a suspended jail sentence given to a misdemeanor 
defendant who did not have counsel, but does not invalidate the underlying 
conviction for purposes of enhancing future crimes. Counsel for the defendant 
argued that, whenever a suspended jail sentence is given to a misdemeanor 
defendant, Shelton does not permit the use of that conviction for enhancement. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The defense's motion to quash the bindover for insufficient evidence is denied. 
The State met its burden at the preliminary hearing of showing probable cause 
regarding the Violation of a Protective Order charge. The defendant's efforts to 
commit homicide against the victim also constitute a violation of the protective 
order, which prohibits the defendant from committing or attempting to commit 
acts of violence against the victim. 
2. The defense's motion to quash the bindover of count II as a third degree felony is 
granted. The Court agrees with the defense that under Alabama v.Shelton, a 
defendant facing a misdemeanor charge is entitled to counsel when a jail sentence 
is rendered, regardless of whether the sentence is suspended or actually imposed. 
Defendant Ferguson did not have counsel at the time he entered his guilty plea 
and received a suspended sentence, therefore the prior conviction cannot be used 
to enhance count II unless the State presents evidence that the defendant 
knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. The Court disagrees with 
the State's argument that Shelton only invalidates the jail sentence given pursuant 
to an uncounselled misdemeanor conviction, and does not impact the conviction 
itself. 
ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the enhancement to count II is stricken, and 
count II stands as a class A misdemeanor. 
DATED this ( day o f January, 2004. 
BY THE COURT: 
Judge ROBIN W JREESE 
Approved as to form 
mmmmmSBM 
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This opinion is subject to revision before final 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
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Benjamin Frank Lucero, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
Sheriff Aaron Kennard, 
Chief Paul Cunningham, 
Salt Lake County Jail, 
Murray City Justice Court, 
Respondents. 
No. 20040339 
F I L E D 
November 15, 2005 
Third District, Salt Lake 
The Honorable Glenn Iwasaki 
No. 020907208 
Attorneys: Joan C. Watt, Heather Brereton, Salt Lake City, for 
petitioner 
Scott Daniels, Salt Lake City, for Murray City 
Justice Court 
Karl L. Hendrickson, Deputy Dist. Att'y, Salt Lake 
City, for Sheriff Aaron Kennard, Chief Paul 
Cunningham, and the Salt Lake County Jail 
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals 
DURRANT, Justice: 
INTRODUCTION 
11 In this case, we are asked to consider whether the 
Post-Conviction Remedies Act ("PCRA") allows collateral attacks 
on a justice court conviction when the defendant has failed to 
seek a trial de novo. The court of appeals concluded that the 
failure to seek a trial de novo bars a justice court defendant 
from obtaining post-conviction relief. We granted certiorari to 
review the court of appeals' opinion. We now affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
12 Petitioner Benjamin Frank Lucero was charged in the 
Murray City Municipal Justice Court with driving under the 
influence of alcohol, Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (Supp. 2004), and 
improper usage of lanes, id. § 41-6-61 (1998). Although the pre-
trial conference was continued twice so that Lucero could retain 
private counsel, Lucero ultimately represented himself throughout 
the proceedings at the justice court. At the justice court 
hearing, Lucero pleaded guilty to driving under the influence, 
and the court dismissed the charge of improper lane usage. The 
justice court subsequently fined Lucero $1,850 and sentenced him 
to 180 days in jail and eighteen months' probation. After 
sentencing, the court found Lucero to be impecunious.1 
13 Lucero subsequently filed a "Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief or, in the alternative, a Motion to Correct 
Illegally Imposed Sentence" in both the Murray Justice Court and 
the Third District Court.2 In his petition, Lucero argued that 
his sentence was imposed in violation of his Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel. The district court, acting in an appellate 
capacity, held a hearing to address Lucero's claims and, after 
considering proffered testimony from the justice court judge, 
affidavits from the justice court clerks, and testimony from 
Lucero, concluded that no Sixth Amendment violation had occurred. 
Accordingly, the district court dismissed Lucero's petition. 
Lucero filed a timely appeal with the court of appeals to review 
the district court's order. 
SI4 In reviewing the district court's decision, the court 
of appeals did not examine whether Lucero had effectively waived 
his right to counsel at the justice court proceeding, but instead 
affirmed the district court on the ground that Lucero was 
ineligible for post-conviction relief because he failed to seek a 
trial de novo in the district court before seeking post-
1
 Although the docket is sparse, it appears that this 
finding was made when determining whether Lucero was capable of 
paying for an outpatient treatment program or the installation of 
an interlock ignition. 
2
 The justice court, in its docket, lists four different 
filing dates for petitions for post-conviction relief. The first 
petition for post-conviction relief was filed with the Murray 
Justice Court on July 3, 2002, within thirty days of the date the 
justice court judgment was rendered. The record does not 
indicate that a petition was filed with the Third District Court 
until nearly a month later, on August 1, 2002. 
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conviction relief. Lucero v. Kennard, 2004 UT App 94, f 13, 89 
P.3d 175. The court of appeals reasoned that any violation of 
Lucero's constitutional right to counsel could have been remedied 
by a trial de novo and, by failing to pursue that remedy, Lucero 
was both procedurally barred from receiving post-conviction 
relief and ineligible for the "unusual circumstances" exception 
to the procedural bar rules. Id. SI 12. We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to Utah Code section 78-2-2(3) (a) (2002) . 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
515 On certiorari, we review the court of appeals' decision 
for correctness, giving its conclusions of law no deference. 
State v. Geukaeuzian. 2004 UT 16, SI 7, 86 P.3d 742. 
ANALYSIS 
516 The issue in this case is whether Lucero is eligible 
for post-conviction relief. To address this issue we must 
determine (1) whether the PCRA applies to justice court 
defendants and, if so, (2) whether Lucero is entitled to post-
conviction relief despite his failure to seek a trial de novo to 
appeal his justice court sentence. We conclude that the PCRA 
applies to justice court defendants, but that Lucero is not 
entitled to post-conviction relief because he failed to seek a 
trial de novo. 
517 By filing a post-conviction petition, a defendant seeks 
to collaterally attack a conviction or sentence. Rudolph v. 
Galetka, 2002 UT 7, SI 5, 43 P.3d 467. In 1996, the legislature 
enacted the PCRA to "establish!] a substantive legal remedy for 
any person who challenges a conviction or sentence for a criminal 
offense,"3 Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-102 (1) (2002), has a valid 
3
 The PCRA does not apply to 
(a) habeas corpus petitions that do not 
challenge a conviction or sentence for a 
criminal offense; 
(b) motions to correct a sentence pursuant to 
Rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; 
or 
(c) actions taken by the Board of Pardons and 
Parole. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-102 (2) (2002). 
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ground for relief,4 id. § 7£-35a-104, and is not procedurally 
barred from bringing a claim for relief, id. § 78-35a-106. 
18 Respondent, Murray City Justice Court (the "Justice 
Court") argues that Lucero is precluded from receiving post-
conviction relief for two reasons: (1) the PCRA does not apply to 
justice court defendants and, even if it does, (2) Lucero is 
procedurally barred from receiving post-conviction relief due to 
his failure to seek de novo review in the district court. Lucero 
responds that the PCRA does not limit post-conviction relief to 
4
 The PCRA establishes five grounds for post-conviction 
relief: 
(a) the conviction was obtained or the 
sentence was imposed in violation of the 
United States Constitution or Utah 
Constitution; 
(b) the conviction was obtained under a 
statute that is in violation of the United 
States Constitution or Utah Constitution, or 
the conduct for which the petitioner was 
prosecuted is constitutionally protected; 
(c) the sentence was imposed in an unlawful 
manner, or probation was revoked in an 
unlawful manner; 
(d) the petitioner had ineffective assistance 
of counsel in violation of the United States 
Constitution or Utah Constitution; or 
(e) newly discovered material evidence exists 
that requires the court to vacate the 
conviction or sentence . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-104(1). 
Lucero attacks his sentence under section 78-35a-
104(1) (a) , arguing that his sentence was imposed in violation of 
his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The court of appeals did 
not assess whether the trial court correctly found that Lucero 
had effectively waived his right to counsel and was therefore not 
entitled to post-conviction relief. The court of appeals instead 
held that Lucero was procedurally barred from receiving post-
conviction relief because he had failed to file for a trial de 
novo in the district court. Lucero v. Kennard, 2004 UT App 94, 
It 13, 89 P. 3d 175. Thus, for the purposes of this proceeding, we 
will assume that if the deprivation of counsel claim contained in 
Lucero's petition is true, he would have grounds for post-
conviction relief. See Webster v. Jones, 587 P.2d 528, 530 (Utah 
1978) (proceeding "upon the assumption that if [the defendant's] 
claims as to the violation of his basic constitutional rights 
were true they might bring him within purview of habeas corpus"). 
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district court defendants and, because he could not argue at a 
trial de novo that the justice court had violated his right to 
counsel, his failure to pursue a trial de novo does not 
procedurally bar him from seeking post-conviction relief. We 
will address each of the arguments in the order presented. 
I. THE PCRA APPLIES TO JUSTICE COURT DECISIONS 
19 We first address the Justice Court's contention that 
justice court defendants are not eligible to receive post-
conviction relief under the PCRA. We conclude that the PCRA does 
not preclude justice court defendants from receiving post-
conviction relief. 
110 Justice courts are distinct from traditional district 
courts in a number of respects. For example, justice courts are 
created by municipalities or counties, Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-
101.5 (2002); have jurisdiction over only certain small claims 
cases, class B and C misdemeanors, and other minor offenses, id. 
§ 78-5-104; and do not maintain a record of the proceedings 
before them, id. § 78-5-101. 
111 Because justice courts do not maintain a record of 
their proceedings, "the appeals process from a justice court 
decision is unique." Bernat v. Allohin, 2005 UT 1, 1 8, 106 P.3d 
707. To appeal a sentence or conviction, a justice court 
defendant must undergo a trial de novo in the district court, 
instead of having an appellate court examine the record of the 
proceedings below to review the lower courts' decision. See id.; 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-120(1); cJL. Dean v. Henriod, 1999 UT App 
50, 91 9 n.l, 975 P.2d 946 ("In the traditional appeal, a 
court . . . reviews the trial court's record and either affirms 
or reverses the judgment entered therein."). This trial de novo 
to appeal from a justice court decision is similar to other 
trials de novo in the sense that the defendant has the 
opportunity to "relitigate the facts as to his guilt or 
innocence" as if the case had originated there. Bernat, 2005 UT 
1, ! 31. But such a trial de novo is not a trial de novo "in the 
strictest sense" because the district court cannot impose a 
greater sentence than that imposed at the justice court 
proceeding. Id. 1 31 n.12. 
112 In this case, rather than seek a trial de novo to 
appeal his justice court sentence, Lucero filed a petition for 
post-conviction relief. The PCRA entitles "any person who 
challenges a conviction or sentence for a criminal offense" to 
post-conviction relief, provided that person meets certain 
requirements. Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-102 (emphasis added). 
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Despite this broad language, which does not appear to limit post-
conviction relief to criminal cases filed in district courts, the 
Justice Court claims that the relief provided by the PCRA does 
not apply to justice court defendants for two reasons. First, it 
argues that the language of the PCRA and the procedural 
provisions governing the act's operation contain requirements 
that cannot be fulfilled by justice court defendants. Second, 
the Justice Court argues that, without a record to review, it is 
so difficult for a district court to determine what occurred at 
the justice court proceeding below that review of a post-
conviction petition in such situations is impracticable. We will 
analyze each argument in turn. 
513 Before addressing the Justice Court's arguments, 
however, it should first be noted that the PCRA cannot limit this 
court's authority to review justice court defendants' petitions 
for post-conviction relief. See Gardner v. Galetka, 2004 UT 42, 
SI 17, 94 P. 3d 263. Under the Utah Constitution, "the power to 
review post-conviction petitions 'quintessentially . . . belongs 
to the judicial branch of government.'" Id. (quoting Hurst v. 
Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1033 (Utah 1989)); see. also Utah Const, art. 
VIII, § 3 ("The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to 
issue all extraordinary writs . . . . " ) . Thus, "the legislature 
may not impose restrictions which limit [post-conviction relief] 
as a judicial rule of procedure, except as provided in the 
constitution." Gardner, 2004 UT 42, SI 17 (internal quotation 
omitted). To the extent the PCRA "purports to erect an absolute 
bar to this court's consideration of . . . post-conviction 
petitions, it suffers from constitutional infirmities." Id. 
Accordingly, the enactment of the PCRA did not, and could not, 
limit this court's right to grant post-conviction relief to 
justice court defendants. Having clarified this point, we now 
turn to the Justice Court's arguments concerning the PCRA's 
applicability to justice court proceedings. 
A. The Requirements of the PCRA May Be Fulfilled by Justice Court 
Defendants• 
114 The Justice Court claims that justice court defendants 
cannot fulfill the requirements contained within the PCRA and its 
procedural provision, Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65C,5 and that 
the defendants are therefore ineligible for post-conviction 
relief. Specifically, the Justice Court argues that a justice 
court defendant cannot fulfill the PCRA's requirements that (1) a 
5
 Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65C "govern[s] proceedings in 
all petitions for post-conviction relief filed under [the PCRA]." 
Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(a). 
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petition for post-conviction relief be filed "in the district 
court of original jurisdiction," Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-104(1); 
(2) a defendant directly appeal or otherwise have an on-the-
record review of their conviction or sentence before seeking 
post-conviction relief, id. § 78-35a-102; and (3) a clerk assign 
and deliver a petition for post-conviction relief to the judge 
who sentenced the petitioner, Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(f). We are not 
persuaded. 
115 First, the Justice Court argues that a justice court 
defendant cannot file a petition in the district court with 
original jurisdiction because district courts do not have 
original jurisdiction over justice court cases. This assertion 
is incorrect because the scope of a district court's original 
jurisdiction is defined more broadly than the scope of its 
subject matter -jurisdiction. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(1), 
(8). Utah Code section 78-3-4, which delineates the scope of a 
district court's jurisdiction, differentiates between a district 
court's original and subject matter jurisdiction. Id. The 
statute states that the district court has original jurisdiction 
over "all matters civil and criminal," not prohibited by the 
constitution or law, id. § 78-3-4(1), but notes that, that 
" [notwithstanding," the district court generally does not have 
subject matter jurisdiction over justice court cases,6 id. § 78-
3-4(8). Therefore, a justice court defendant may file a petition 
for post-conviction relief in the district court of original 
jurisdiction by filing it with the district court located in the 
6
 Notwithstanding [the scope of a district 
court's original jurisdiction], the district 
court has subject matter jurisdiction in 
class B misdemeanors, class C misdemeanors, 
infractions, and violations of ordinances 
only if: 
(a) there is no justice court with 
territorial jurisdiction; 
(b) the matter was properly filed in the 
circuit court prior to July 1, 1996; 
(c) the offense occurred within the 
boundaries of the municipality in which the 
district courthouse is located and that 
municipality has not formed a 5 u s ti c e court; 
or 
(d) they are included in an indictment or 
information covering a single criminal 
episode alleging the commission of a felony 
or a class A misdemeanor. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4 (8) (2002). 
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same district as the justice court. 
116 Second, the Justice Court argues that justice court 
defendants cannot fulfill the PCRA requirements because they 
cannot directly appeal a conviction or receive an on-the-record 
review of the proceedings below. The Justice Court cites three 
instances in which the PCRA and rule 65C require a defendant to 
directly appeal a conviction or sentence in order to be eligible 
for post-conviction relief. First, to be entitled to post-
conviction relief, the PCRA states that a defendant must have 
"exhausted all other legal remedies, including a direct appeal." 
Id. § 78-35a-102. Second, rule 65C requires that the petition 
for post-conviction relief state "whether the judgment . . . has 
been reviewed on appeal." Utah R. Civ. P. 65C (C) (4). Third, 
rule 65C requires that the petition for post-conviction relief 
include a copy of "any opinion issued by an appellate court 
regarding the direct appeal of the petitioner's case." Id. 
65C(d) (2) . 
117 Nowhere in the PCRA or rule 65C, however, are on-the-
record reviews and direct appeals mandated. Instead, the 
provisions cited by the Justice Court merely require that 
defendants pursue a direct appeal if that remedy is available and 
that the petition for post-conviction relief include a statement 
about whether an appeal has occurred and, if it has, a copy of 
that appeal. Thus, justice court defendants can meet the PCRA 
requirements by exhausting the available legal remedies and 
including in their petitions for post-conviction relief a 
statement that the justice court judgment has not been reviewed 
on appeal. 
118 Third, the Justice Court argues that a clerk cannot 
assign a petition for post-conviction relief to the judge who 
sentenced the petitioner because justice court judges do not have 
jurisdiction over petitions for post-conviction relief. This 
argument fails because rule 65C allows a clerk to assign the 
petition "in the normal course" if the judge who sentenced the 
defendant is unavailable. Id. 65C(f). 
119 In short, justice court defendants can fulfill all of 
the requirements that the PCRA and rule 65C place on defendants 
seeking post-conviction relief. 
B. A Court May Review Petitions for Post-Conviction Relief 
Without a Record. 
120 We next address the Justice Court's argument that a 
district court cannot determine whether to grant post-conviction 
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relief to justice court defendants because the absence of a 
record of the proceedings below renders a review of the petition 
impracticable. Although a review without the aid of a record may 
be more difficult than a review in which a record is available, 
we conclude that a court is capable of determining whether a 
justice court defendant is entitled to post-conviction relief 
even without a record of the proceedings below. 
SI21 The Justice Court supports its argument that a record 
is essential for an appellate court to conduct a meaningful 
review of the justice court's proceedings by citing to Jones v. 
State, 789 N.E.2d 478 (Ind. 2003). In Jones, the Indiana Supreme 
Court noted that Indiana's post-conviction relief statute seemed 
generally applicable, but held that it was written with courts of 
record in mind because a transcript of the trial was necessary to 
assess the types of claims asserted in post-conviction 
proceedings. Id. at 480. The court reasoned that the claims 
generally raised in petitions for post-conviction relief are 
dependent on what happened in the proceedings below. Id. As an 
example, the court noted that for an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim, a review of the record was necessary to examine 
the adequacy of counsel's performance. Id. at 481. Without a 
transcript, the court would be forced to rely on "the memories of 
the participants in a misdemeanor trial that occurred years in 
the past." Id. 
ST22 Jones, however, is inharmonious with our case law. 
While we have previously recognized the difficulty that an 
appellate court may have in deciding whether to grant post-
conviction relief without a record of the proceedings below, we 
have also reviewed petitions for post-conviction relief without 
the aid of a record. See Webster v. Jones, 587 P.2d 528, 529 
(Utah 1978). In Webster, this court reviewed a city court 
defendant's petition for post-conviction relief based on a denial 
of the defendant's right to counsel. Id. Although there was no 
record and the court acknowledged that the plaintiff's testimony 
was "self-serving," the court was able to adequately discern what 
happened at the proceedings below by looking at the court docket 
and considering the plaintiff's own testimony. Id. 
1123 Furthermore, in instances where there is even less 
evidence of what occurred at the proceeding below than that 
presented in Webster, a court may determine whether a party is 
entitled to post-conviction relief by deciding who has the burden 
of proof and whether that burden has been met. The absence of a 
record does not foreclose post-conviction challenges, but merely 
makes it more difficult for a party to meet the applicable 
burden. 
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<I24 In a proceeding where a defendant seeks to collaterally 
attack a court's judgment, we presume the regularity of the 
proceedings below. Price v. Turner, 502 P.2d 121, 122 (Utah 
1972) ("After one has been convicted of crime [sic] the 
presumption of innocence and other protections afforded an 
accused no longer obtain. The presumptions then are in favor of 
the propriety of the proceedings . . . . " ) ; see also Johnson v. 
Zerbst. 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938) ("When collaterally attacked, 
the judgment of a court carries with it a presumption of 
regularity."), overruled on other grounds bv Edwards v. Arizona, 
451 U.S. 477 (1981). The petitioner bears the burden of 
overcoming this presumption by a preponderance of the evidence. 
See Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155, 161 (1957); Johnson, 304 
U.S. at 469; see also Price, 502 P.2d at 122 (placing burden of 
rebutting presumption of regularity upon the petitioner). 
125 That presumption notwithstanding, the analysis of 
whether a defendant is entitled to post-conviction relief is more 
complicated in cases where a defendant raises a deprivation of 
counsel claim because of the "special status" conferred upon the 
constitutional right to counsel. Lackawanna County Dist. 
Attorney v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394, 404 (2001) (concluding that 
failure to appoint counsel claim "warrants special treatment 
among alleged constitutional violations"); see Custis v. United 
States. 511 U.S. 485, 494-96 (1994) (discussing the "historical 
basis" for treating collateral attacks based on a denial of the 
right to counsel differently than other constitutional rights). 
A court may not presume waiver of the right to counsel unless 
there is some evidence that the defendant affirmatively 
acquiesced to the waiver of counsel. See Carnlev v. Cochran, 369 
U.S. 506, 516-17 (1962) ("[N]o . . . burden [to overcome a 
presumption of regularity] can be imposed upon an accused unless 
the record—or a hearing, where required—reveals his affirmative 
acquiescence."); State v. Hamilton, 1987 Utah LEXIS 638 at *5 
("Waiver [of the right to counsel] may not be presumed by a 
silent record."); see also Arbuckle v. Turner, 440 F.2d 586, 589 
(10th Cir. 1971) (holding that waiver of the right to counsel 
cannot be presumed); Clark v. Turner, 283 F. Supp. 909, 913 (D. 
Utah 1968) (same). If such evidence is presented, the defendant 
has the burden of proving that the right to counsel was not 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived. See Iowa v. 
Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 92 (2004) ("[I]n a collateral attack on an 
uncounseled conviction, it is the defendant's burden to prove 
that he did not competently and intelligently waive his right to 
the assistance of counsel."); Carnlev, 369 U.S. at 515 
("Presuming waiver [of the right to counsel] from a silent record 
is impermissible. The record must show, or there must be an 
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allegation and evidence which show, that an accused was offered 
counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the 
offer."); see also Dyett v. Turner, 287 F. Supp. 113, 115-16 (D. 
Utah 1968) (imposing burden on defendant to show invalidity of 
waiver of counsel when the record did not indicate that the 
waiver was involuntary); McGhee v. Sialer, 328 F. Supp. 538, 542 
(D. Neb. 1971) ("[I]f there was acquiescence by the defendant in 
the trial court's not appointing counsel, the burden then becomes 
the defendant's . . . . " ) . 
126 In this case Lucero seeks post-conviction relief based 
on an alleged violation of his right to counsel. Like the court 
in Webster, the district court attempted to discern what occurred 
in the proceedings below by looking at the court docket and 
accepting testimony and other evidence. After considering the 
evidence, the district court determined that Lucero effectively 
waived his right to counsel and that he was not entitled to post-
conviction relief. 
127 As demonstrated by the proceedings in Webster and in 
the district court below, the task of determining whether to 
grant post-conviction relief without a record, although 
difficult, is not impossible. Even though the task of discerning 
what occurred at the proceedings below is sometimes onerous, it 
is still a judicial duty, and difficulty is not an argument for 
shirking that duty. 
II. LUCERO IS NOT ELIGIBLE FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
128 Having determined that the PCRA applies to justice 
court defendants, we now turn to the central issue in this case: 
whether Lucero is eligible for post-conviction relief even though 
he failed to seek a trial de novo to appeal from the justice 
court decision. Because Lucero did not exhaust his legal 
remedies when he failed to seek a trial de novo and does not 
qualify for the unusual circumstances exception to the procedural 
bar rules, we conclude that he is not eligible for such relief. 
129 Our common law post-conviction jurisprudence is 
markedly different than the PCRA. Most notably, under our common 
law jurisprudence, a defendant is procedurally barred from 
receiving post-conviction relief in instances where "a contention 
of error [was] known or should have been known to the petitioner 
at the time of judgment," and the defendant failed to raise the 
error and appeal it "through the regular and prescribed 
procedure." Carter v. Galetka, 2001 UT 96, 1 14, 44 P.3d 626. 
In contrast, the PCRA contains two provisions that significantly 
limit a defendant's right to seek post-conviction relief. First, 
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section 78-35a-106 precludes a petitioner from receiving post-
conviction relief if the ground for relief 
(a) may still be raised on direct appeal or 
by a post-trial motion; 
(b) was raised or addressed at trial or on 
appeal; 
(c) could have been but was not raised at 
trial or on appeal [unless due to ineffective 
assistance of counsel]; 
(d) was raised or addressed in any previous 
request for post-conviction relief or could 
have been, but was not, raised in a previous 
request for post-conviction relief; or 
(e) is barred by the [one-year] limitation 
period established in Section 78-35a-107. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106 (2002). Second, to be eligible for 
post-conviction relief, the defendant must have "exhausted all 
other legal remedies, including a direct appeal." Id. § 78-35a-
102. 
f30 Also, under our common law post-conviction 
jurisprudence, in instances where a defendant was procedurally 
barred from receiving post-conviction relief, a court could 
nevertheless grant such relief if the court determined that 
unusual circumstances existed. Carter, 2001 UT 96, SI 15; see 
also Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1035-36 (Utah 1989). An 
equivalent exception is noticeably absent from the PCRA. 
5131 Despite these apparent differences, the PCRA does not 
place any additional restrictions on this court's ability to 
review petitions for post-conviction relief, nor does it limit 
our ability to apply common law exceptions to the procedural bar 
rules codified therein. See supra 1 12; see also Gardner v. 
Galetka, 2004 UT 42, fl 9, 17-18, 94 P.3d 263 (holding that our 
common law post-conviction procedural bar jurisprudence survived 
the enactment of the PCRA). 
132 In this case, the Justice Court contends that Lucero is 
ineligible for post-conviction relief because he failed to pursue 
a trial de novo. Even though the Justice Court concedes that a 
claim that a constitutional right has been violated in the 
proceeding below cannot be raised at the trial de novo, it argues 
that such a proceeding is an available legal remedy for such 
claims. In this case, we rely on the PCRA's exhaustion of 
remedies requirement to determine whether Lucero is eligible for 
post-conviction relief because that requirement is consistent 
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with our common law procedural bar jurisprudence, which requires 
a defendant to raise a known error and appeal it through regular 
and prescribed procedures. Carter, 2001 UT 96, 1 14. Therefore, 
to determine whether the court of appeals erred in dismissing 
Lucero's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, we must first 
ascertain whether Lucero exhausted his legal remedies. Then, if 
he did not, we must determine whether unusual circumstances exist 
that excuse his failure to exhaust his legal remedies. 
A. Lucero Failed to Exhaust His Legal Remedies 
133 To determine whether Lucero was eligible for post-
conviction relief, we must first ascertain whether he exhausted 
his legal remedies. Because Lucero failed to pursue a trial de 
novo, which would have provided a plain, speedy, and adequate 
remedy to the violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, 
we conclude that he did not. 
134 Lucero argues that he was not required to seek a de 
novo trial to be eligible for post-conviction relief because his 
claim that he was deprived of counsel at the justice court 
proceeding could not be raised in a de novo trial. The Justice 
Court does not refute this contention, but instead asserts that 
Lucero is not eligible for post-conviction relief because the 
deprivation of his right to counsel could have been remedied at 
such a trial. We agree with the Justice Court. 
135 Other jurisdictions that have addressed this issue have 
adopted two different approaches: (1) allowing justice court 
defendants to elect between filing for a trial de novo, thereby 
waiving their constitutional claims, or filing for post-
conviction relief, see Commonwealth v. Speights, 509 A.2d 1263, 
1264 n.2 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986); and (2) allowing a district court 
to review constitutional due process claims at the trial de novo, 
see Hardin v. People, 216 P.2d 429, 430 (Colo. 1950) ("All 
[complaints, including denial of counsel,] could have been urged 
on appeal to the county court . . . . " ) . The Justice Court 
advocates yet another approach—requiring all justice court 
defendants to undergo a trial de novo before seeking post-
conviction relief. 
136 We decline to adopt any of these approaches as each is 
inharmonious with the nature of and policy behind post-conviction 
relief. To be eligible for post-conviction relief, defendants 
have consistently been required to appeal errors through regular 
and prescribed procedures in order to prevent extraordinary 
relief from being used as a substitute for normal appellate 
procedures. See Carter, 2001 UT 96, 1 14; Codianna v. Morris, 
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660 P.2d 1101, 1104 (Utah 1983). As an extraordinary remedy, 
post-conviction relief can only be granted w[w]here no other 
plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available." Utah R. Civ. P. 
65B. 
137 Therefore, we must reject the election-of-remedy 
approach because it would establish post-conviction relief as an 
available substitute to normal appellate procedure in direct 
contravention of the purpose behind extraordinary relief. 
Furthermore, such an approach may lead to inconsistent remedies 
for identical constitutional violations depending upon what 
remedy the justice court defendant elected. We also reject the 
approach that allows a district court to examine constitutional 
due process claims at a trial de novo and the approach that 
requires a defendant to undergo a trial de novo, because these 
approaches would either expand the scope of a trial de novo or 
lead to a waste of judicial resources in situations where a trial 
de novo could not remedy the alleged constitutional violation. 
538 Instead, we adopt a more flexible test. As mentioned 
above, to be entitled to post-conviction relief, a petitioner 
must pursue any regular and prescribed method for attacking a 
conviction or sentence that would provide a plain, speedy, and 
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The regular and 
prescribed method for appealing a justice court conviction is to 
seek a trial de novo in the district court. Utah Code Ann. § 78-
5-120 (2002). Thus, the critical inquiry to determine whether a 
justice court defendant must seek a de novo trial in order to 
meet the exhaustion requirement and be eligible for post-
conviction relief is this: could a trial de novo provide the 
justice court defendant with a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy 
for the alleged constitutional violation? In other words, where 
an appropriate remedy for a constitutional violation would be a 
new trial, a justice court defendant must undergo a trial de novo 
to meet the exhaustion requirement. To obtain post-conviction 
relief if a justice court defendant has not sought a trial de 
novo, the defendant must establish that the constitutional 
violation was the kind that would demand relief beyond a new 
trial.7 
7
 A trial de novo may not be an adequate remedy for certain 
constitutional violations such as failure to grant a speedy trial 
or when exculpatory evidence has been lost or destroyed. Also, a 
court must dismiss a case with prejudice in instances where 
prosecutorial misconduct is so severe that lesser sanctions could 
not result in a fair trial. U.S. v. Lin Lyn Trading, Ltd.. 149 
F.3d 1112, 1118 (10th Cir. 1998); see New Mexico v. Eder, 704 
(continued...) 
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139 In this case, Lucero has alleged that he was deprived 
of his right to counsel. Both the federal and Utah constitutions 
guarantee a defendant's right to counsel. U.S. Const, amend. VI; 
Utah Const, art. I, § 12. "Concomitant with this right is the 
criminal defendant's guaranteed right to elect to present his own 
defense." State v. Hassan. 2004 UT 99, 1 21, 108 P.3d 695. 
540 When a defendant elects to proceed pro se, is 
convicted, and subsequently attacks the conviction or sentence 
based on a deprivation of the right to counsel, the court must 
determine whether the defendant exercised the "right to self-
representation voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently." Id. 
If the court concludes that the waiver was ineffective, the court 
may remedy the violation of that right in a number of ways. See 
generally Karen L. Ellmore, Annotation, Relief Available for 
Violation of Right to Counsel at Sentencing in State Criminal 
Trial, 65 A.L.R. 4th 183 (2004) (listing forms of relief 
available when counsel is absent from a sentencing hearing). For 
example, a court may vacate the sentence and order a new trial, 
Billings v. Smith, 932 P.2d 1058, 1063 (Mont. 1997) (vacating 
sentence and granting new trial to remedy denial of effective 
assistance of counsel); modify the defendant's sentence with or 
without a new penalty hearing, see Gardner v. Holden, 888 P.2d 
7
 (. . .continued) 
P.2d 465, 467-69 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985) (discussing cases where 
dismissal with prejudice is required to remedy prosecutorial 
misconduct). For example, prosecutorial misconduct that is 
severe enough to prevent a trial de novo from providing an 
adequate remedy for an alleged constitutional violation includes 
the following: when the prosecutor has prevented a defendant 
from collecting evanescent, exculpatory evidence, McNutt v. 
Arizona, 648 P.2d 122, 125 (Ariz. 1982) ("Dismissal of the case 
with prejudice is the appropriate remedy because the State's 
action foreclosed a fair trial by preventing petitioner from 
collecting exculpatory evidence no longer available."); when 
there is a failure to prosecute, Utah Rules of Crim. P. 25(b)(1); 
when the state refuses to identify an informant, Harris v. 
Superior Court, 35 Cal. App. 3d 24, 26-27 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973) 
("If the original trial without [the identity of a material 
witness] was unfair, a retrial sans same would be nothing but a 
replay of a constitutionally defective record."); when an 
informant or other inappropriate party was present during 
privileged conversations, U.S. v. Lew, 577 F.2d 200, 210 (3d 
Cir. 1978); or when the prosecutor has breached a bargain not to 
prosecute, see U.S. v. Pascal, 496 F. Supp 313, 319 (N.D. Ill 
1979). 
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608, 611 (Utah 1994) (discussing correctness of trial court's 
decision to grant defendant a new penalty hearing and appeal to 
remedy the alleged denial of effective assistance of counsel); 
Kuehnert v. Turner. 499 P.2d 839, 840-41 (Utah 1972) (remanding 
for resentencing hearing to remedy absence of counsel at 
sentencing); preserve the original sentence if the court finds 
that the defendant was not prejudiced by the absence of counsel, 
see State v. Neal. 262 P.2d 756, 758-59 (Utah 1953) (preserving 
original sentence because sentencing was merely a ministerial act 
and counsel could not have assisted defendant at sentencing); or, 
in "comparatively few" cases, set aside the sentence and release 
the defendant from confinement, Ellmore, supra Sf 39, at 192; 
Shavesteh v. S. Salt Lake, 217 F.3d 1281, 1284 (10th Cir. 2000) 
("By denying the defendant counsel, the court effectively waives 
its right to sentence him to prison." (internal quotation 
omitted)). 
1141 Although a trial de novo may not be the justice court 
defendant's preferred alternative, it provides an adequate remedy 
for a deprivation of counsel claim because the district court can 
appoint counsel at the "critical guilt adjudication stage." See 
Alabama v. Shelton. 535 U.S. 654, 668 n.5 (2002). In fact, the 
de novo trial is a more favorable form of appeal than that 
offered to redress constitutional violations committed at the 
district court level. Bernat v. Allphin, 2005 UT 1, 1 41, 106 
P.3d 707 ("[A] justice court defendant is . . . treated more 
favorably than a similarly situated district court defendant."); 
see also Jones v. State, 789 N.E.2d 478, 480 (Ind. 2003) (noting 
that a trial de novo is "the most congenial form of appeal"). 
Before an appellate court may order a new trial in an appeal from 
a district court, the court must conduct an evidentiary hearing 
to determine whether there was prejudicial error in the 
proceedings below. See Bernat, 2005 UT 1, f 18; Utah v. 
Arauelles. 921 P.2d 439, 441 (Utah 1996) (requiring defendant to 
show that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the 
defendant); Jones, 789 N.E.2d at 480. In the justice court 
context, however, a justice court defendant has a "second 
opportunity to relitigate the facts relating to his or her guilt 
or innocence" as a matter of right. Bernat. 2005 UT 1, ! 41. 
Accordingly, we conclude that Lucero did not exhaust his legal 
remedies because any violation of Lucero's right to counsel could 
have been adequately remedied by a trial de novo. 
B. Unusual Circumstances Exception 
f42 Having determined that Lucero failed to exhaust his 
legal remedies, we now turn to the issue of whether unusual 
circumstances exist that excuse this omission. We conclude that 
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Lucero is not eligible for post-conviction relief under the 
unusual circumstances exception. 
143 The unusual circumstances exception provides a 
defendant who is otherwise ineligible to receive post-conviction 
relief an opportunity to have a petition for post-conviction 
relief reviewed. Carter, 2001 UT 96, 1 15; Hurst. 777 P.2d at 
1035. Therefore, once a court determines that a defendant is 
procedurally barred from seeking post-conviction relief, the 
court must then ascertain whether the defendant is nevertheless 
entitled to have an appellate court review the petition because 
unusual circumstances exist. 
144 Lucero argues that the court of appeals misapplied the 
unusual circumstances exception by improperly combining the 
exhaustion of remedies and unusual circumstances analyses. 
Although we recognize that the unusual circumstances exception 
requires an analysis independent of the exhaustion of remedies 
analysis, we conclude that the court of appeals properly 
determined that unusual circumstances do not exist in this case. 
145 To qualify for the unusual circumstances exception to 
the procedural bar rules, a petitioner must demonstrate that "an 
obvious injustice or a substantial and prejudicial denial of a 
constitutional right" has occurred. Carter, 2001 UT 96, 1 15; 
see also Hurst, 777 P.2d at 1035. "The unusual circumstances 
test was intended to assure fundamental fairness and to require 
reexamination of a conviction on habeas corpus when the nature of 
the alleged error was such that it would be unconscionable not to 
reexamine . . . and thereby to assure that substantial justice 
was done." Holden, 888 P.2d at 613 (internal quotation omitted). 
146 In this case, Lucero has not demonstrated that unusual 
circumstances exist that excuse his failure to seek a trial de 
novo. He filed his petition for post-conviction relief within 
thirty days of the date that the justice court entered its 
sentence. At that time, Lucero was still statutorily eligible to 
file for a trial de novo. Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-120 (2002) . The 
record indicates that Lucero was represented by counsel at the 
time he decided to pursue post-conviction relief instead of a 
trial de novo. Given these facts, the circumstances surrounding 
this case do not rise to the level of an obvious injustice or a 
substantial and prejudicial denial of a constitutional right. 
CONCLUSION 
147 We conclude that the PCRA does not limit this court's 
authority to grant post-conviction relief to justice court 
17 No. 20040339 
defendants. We further conclude that Lucero failed to exhaust 
his legal remedies and that he is not otherwise entitled to a 
review of his petition for post-conviction relief under the 
unusual circumstances exception. We therefore affirm. 
SI48 Chief Justice Durham, Associate Chief Justice Wilkins, 
Justice Parrish, and Justice Nehring concur in Justice Durrant's 
opinion. 
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